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Imagine an America completely free of violent crime.  What if, through the combination 
of modern technology and political will, we could be 100 percent safe from physical assaults on 
our streets ?  What is this could goal could be achieved without jeopardizing civil liberty or 
personal privacy?    Impossible?   
 
Consider this scenario: 
 
In the future, science establishes that every person on earth has a particular gait they 
display every time they show themselves in public.  Let=s say that scientists design a way to 
assign a unique identifier that corresponds this gait.  This identifier will be a set of alpha-numeric 
 digits, unique to each individual, which correspond how we move while walking.  It is not based 
on any private information; the act of putting one foot in front of the other to propel your body 
down a public street has never been considered a private act or something reasonable people 
consciously try to conceal.  
 
Let's assume that this identifier can be assigned on the basis of a video capturing a person 
walking 10 paces, and that it is robust enough the discern intentional attempts to disguise one's 
walking style.  The Agait identifier@ is assigned whenever someone applies for a driver's license or 
enters the United States through an immigration checkpoint.  It is done on the basis of a 10-
second video capture that is taken at the same time driver's license or US entry.  The national 
"gait identity registry" is kept in a single secure government database, unavailable to the public.  
Persons incapable of walking, since they do not comprise an urban violent crime threat, are 
exempted from the registry. 
 
1 J.D., UCLA 1988; B.A., Yale, 1985.  Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Section United States 
Department of Justice.  The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect 
those of his employer.  The author can be reached at jeffrey.breinholt@usdoj.gov.
Meanwhile, satellite reconnaissance technology develops to the point where digital video 
can be taken of an entire U.S. urban area.  This technology is efficient enough to operate 
effectively irrespective of weather, and sufficiently precise to capture enough of a moving image 
to allow modern computers to be able to compare it to the government-maintained gait index 
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registry.  A digital video can be taken continuously, 24 hours a day, and stored for a period of 
several months before being discarded. 
 
A legal regime in established through which law enforcement officials can petition a U.S. 
district court to order another part of the government to process and release a videoclip of certain 
duration directed at particular geographic coordinates.  Armed with the video, law enforcement 
can push a button and compare it to nationwide gait index registry, and establish who was present 
at a certain time and certain place in the five boroughs of New York City. 
 
One night, a school teacher in the Bronx is killed in an apparent robbery as she walks 
away from an ATM machine. Pursuant to the established legal regime, local homicide detectives 
obtain judicial approval to obtain the satellite footage for a four-minute period where the body is 
found, at the approximate time of death.  The cops now have a digital recording of the murder, 
although it is not of sufficient quality for them to analyze it themselves. 
 
Armed with this footage, the cops cause it to be run against the gait index registry.  This 
process quickly gives them a hit.  The computer finds a match and generates the name and a local 
thug whose unique style of movement matches the video of the assailant.  They locate  and arrest 
him.  At his trial, the prosecutor calls a witness to authenticate the video footage and the 
particular method that resulted in the match on the gait index registry.  She then puts on an expert 
who describes this process, and renders an opinion that the person who killed the school teacher 
has a gait that matches that of the defendant to a mathematical certainty.  The jury convicts the 
defendant of murder. 
 
What happens now?  The technology that facilitated this conviction is not a sensitive 
intelligence method.  After all, it was deliberately disclosed and described to the public in the 
murder trial.  In fact, by this time, it is already well-known to the American people, whose 
elected officials have enacted the legal regime that made it possible.  This legislative process was 
the subject of extensive media coverage and public dialogue, and open discussion between the 
civil libertarians and the pro-security partisans.  It was carefully considered by the U.S. Congress 
and the President who signed the bill creating the regime.   
 
This public debate had some additional benefits.  The application of this technology to 
the problem of violent street crime puts would-be violent criminals on notice that their conduct, 
committed outdoors, is perpetually being captured on video and capable of being reviewed if they 
decide to commit violence crime somewhere on the city streets.  The footage, captured 24-hours 
a day, is only processed upon a court order supported by probable cause, and is accessible by law 
enforcement who demonstrate to a neutral judicial officer that a violent crime has been 
committed at a particular time and place.   
 
Word spreads.  The bad guys are deterred.  Rational actors, they soon work the risk of 
being caught into their calculation whether to engage in street crime.  Their decisions are affected 
by their interminable fear that what they do, in the great outdoors, in a setting as easily witnessed 
Getting Real About Privacy 
J. Breinholt – September 2005 -3-
by innocent bystanders as by the government's eye in the sky. Outside violent crime becomes a 
thing of the past.  Empirically, people are now more safe outdoors than within their homes.  The 
economy booms.  The United States has become the sole democracy to eliminate violent crime. 
 
What about the cost?  The U.S. does not even need to establish satellite coverage of every 
American city.  It merely needs to rotate the satellites in an unannounced way, to keep the violent 
criminals guessing and uncomfortable. Are Americans outraged by this?  If so, they are going to 
have to weigh their disapproval against the obvious benefits B the certainty that they can walk 
with their families, in any city, any time, day or night, irrespective of their gender or socio-
economic status, and be completely secure in their persons and property - something never 
thought possible.  Urban violent crime is eliminated.  Police presence is decreased.  Many of the 
cops on the street are transferred to desk jobs where they become experts in this new technology. 
 It has taken a concerted, zero-tolerance, enforcement initiative to convince the bad guys that it's 
not worth the risk.   Over time, an entire generation of Americans grows up without any personal 
sense of danger from strangers on the street, other than what they watch in movies and television 
reruns set in the past.  
 
What about the potential for abuse?  The government puts its full weight behind the 
security of these tools, aggressively punishing those who try to hack into the system, as well as 
law enforcement personnel who do not follow the rules and leak information collected under this 
initiative.  There is no private access of either the satellite product or the gait index registry.  
While the fact of the technology and its capabilities is well-known, the product of it can be 
accessed neither by private persons nor rogue law enforcement for their own personal agendas.  
Violations may occasionally occur, but the culprits of treated sufficiently tough for it not to be a 
common occurrence. 
 
Is this scenario technologically feasible?  For purposes of this article, I am not concerned 
with that question, since the foregoing is merely as a tool through which to consider the 
controversy over the trade-offs between freedom and security in 21st Century America. Since 
9/11, bookstores have been filled with polemic arguments and academic studies, offering 
prescriptions on how to assure the safety of Americans while maintaining our way of life.  Many 
of these books argue that we are on the wrong path, destined to regret the hysterical reaction now 
on display towards Islamic fundamentalism.  They seem to take on faith the notion that we are 
going way too far in the application of technology to day-to-day police problems.  Many of them 
break down on the weight of their own arguments, and do not adequately address the type of 
legal regime I describe above. 
 
Jeffrey Rosen and The Naked Crowd 
One of the more recent books is The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in 
an Anxious Age (Random House, 2004), by George Washington University Law Professor 
Jeffrey Rosen.1 Professor Rosen is very uncomfortable with the post-9/11 threat that modern 
technology poses to personal privacy and individual freedom.  Unlike other commentators, 
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however, Rosen=s fear is not necessarily a government run amok, although there is some of that.  
Crediting the possibility that Congress and the judiciary may be able to effectively control crime-
fighting technology so it does not infringe of liberty, Rosen=s concern is mainly with the public 
itself who -- unlike him -- appears incapable of seeing the dangers and insisting on technological 
architecture that is both effective and privacy-protecting.  Because of this ambivalence, he 
argues, we are doomed not recognize necessary controls and to accept draconian government 
surveillance while losing our most cherished freedoms.   
 
Rosen=s view of the average citizen in a democratic society drives his argument.  The title 
of the book derives from a certain security technology he describes in the prologue.  After 9/11, 
security officials tested a machine that Rosen calls the Naked Machine.  By bouncing 
microwaves off the human body, the machine produces a three-dimensional naked image of the 
subject.  Not only does it expose guns and weapons concealed in the subjects= clothing, but also 
their unique anatomical characteristics.  
 
The utility of the Naked Machine to counterterrorism is obvious.   It seems that the Naked 
Machine can be refined further, to produce images that extract the concealed objects and projects 
them onto a sexless mannequin B an invention Rosen calls the Blob Machine.  Americans care 
deeply about personal privacy and human dignity and, given the choice, obviously prefer the 
Blob Machine to the Naked Machine, right?   To Rosen=s chagrin, studies how this is not always 
the case.  It seems that many people actually express of preference for the Naked Machine.  He 
explains: 
 
When asked why, the people who choose the Naked Machine over the Blob 
Machine give a range of responses.  Some say they are already searches so 
thoroughly at airports that they have abandoned all hope of privacy and don=t mind 
the additional intrusion of being naked.  Others say they=re not embarrassed to be 
naked in front of strangers, adding that those who have nothing to hide should 
have nothing to fear.  (A few are unapologetic exhibitionists.)  Still others are 
concerned that the Blob Machine would be less accurate in identifying weapons 
than the Naked Machine, and they would prefer not to take chances.  And in each 
group there are some people who say they are so afraid of terrorism on airplanes 
that they would do anything possible to make themselves feel better, even if they 
understand, on some level, that their reaction is based on emotions rather than 
evidence.  They describe a willingness to be electronically stripped by the Naked 
Machine as a ritualistic demonstration of their own purity and trustworthiness in 
much the same way that the religiously devout describe rituals of faith.  They 
don=t care, in other words, whether or not the Naked Machine makes them safer 
than the Blob Machine because they are more concerned about feeling safe than 
being safe.2
Rosen bemoans this fact.  Anxiety over personal safety means that people are willing to 
show themselves naked B to join the Naked Crowd B rather than hold to their principles and insist 
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on technological restrictions to assure their continuing privacy.  Rosen=s book is devoted to tries 
to convince us of the dangers.  He hates that citizens are so willing to embarrass themselves over 
the Internet,3 and he attributes this to increased anxiety over identity, which he claims drives 
people to be more concerned with maintaining their feeling of connectedness than the Asocial 
costs of exposure.@4
What would Rosen say about the Agait index registry@ scenario I posit above?  Based on 
his words in the Naked Crowd, he would be likely to find something wrong with it, overstating 
the dangers while minimizing the significance of a crime-free society.  In the book, while he 
acknowledges possibility of designing technology and laws that protect both liberty and security, 
he argues that this process needs to be value driven, lest we accept the juggernaut of technologies 
that are both ineffective and threaten our privacy.5 To illustrate his point, he describes the United 
Kingdom=s fixation with surveillance cameras as a cure for their crime problem, technology he 
claims, through empirical studies, has failed to make British society any safer.6 It is here that 
Rosen gives himself away.  Discussing the U.K. experience with video cameras as crime-fighting 
tools, Rosen notes that the cameras are designed not to produce arrests but to make people feel 
they are constantly being watched.7 They are Aintended to scare local hoodlums into thinking 
they might be setting off alarms even when the cameras are turned off.@8 This, to Rosen, is a 
terrible thing.  He argues that the cameras are in tension with the value of society, since they 
Apromote social conformity.@9 and that it would be a mistake for the U.S. to follow the lead of our 
English colleagues.10 He does not answer the obvious question: what=s wrong with promoting 
conformity with laws designed to prevent people from physically abusing others? 
 
The reason for this may be the author=s cavalier attitude towards crime and a dismissive 
attitude towards those who feel Americans have a right to be secure in their persons and property, 
or believe that a society like ours need not tolerate lawlessness which can be eliminated or 
minimized without infringing on reasonable expectations of privacy.  Rosen is afraid of the 
government=s use of technology becoming too efficient, of an America becoming too safe.  He 
openly worries that modern technology raises the prospect that persons misidentified as serious 
criminals being punished for Atrivial crimes that are far easier to detect,@ while ignoring the fact 
that even small crimes are criminal offenses.11 He hypothesizes that citizens will feel a sense of 
indignation at living in a zero-tolerance society in which they are prosecuted for minor 
infractions of the law.12 If crime is the price we pay for living in a free society, Rosen seems to 
say, the elimination of crime cannot occur without the elimination of privacy.  It is as if security 
and privacy are on opposite sides of an algebraic equation.  If crime could be eliminated through 
technology, the people who would feel the real indignation are those who cannot be weaned of 
their notion that all crime-fighting involves invasions of reasonable expectations of privacy.  If 
the Asilver bullet@ crime-fighting technology does not offend most people, Rosen believes that it 
should.  Why?  Because, like many commentators, Rosen embraces eccentric notions of privacy. 
 
Rosen=s previous writing demonstrates his sympathies.  Written after 9/11, The Naked 
Crowd and acknowledges (while complaining about) the need to consider technological advances 
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to increase security.  Rosen=s views have not changed much since the release of his previous 
book on the subject, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America (Vintage 
2000), released prior to 9/11.13 The chosen title of this earlier book is a tip-off about Rosen=s
tolerance for eccentricity. 
 
The concept of the Aunwanted gaze@ comes from what Rosen describes as a  Aremarkable@
development in Jewish law, known as the Hezzek Re=iyyah. This doctrine would expand the right 
of privacy to protect people not only from physical intrusions into their homes but also from 
surveillance Aby a neighbor outside the home, peering though a window in the common 
courtyard.@14 He writes:  
 
Jewish law protects neighbors not only from unwanted observation, but also from 
the possibility of being observed.  Thus, if your neighbor constructs a window that 
overlooks your home or courtyard, you are entitled to an injunction that not only 
prohibits your neighbor from observing you but also orders the window to be 
removed.  From its earliest days, Jewish law recognized that it was the uncertainty 
about whether or not we are being observed that forces us to lead more constricted 
lives and inhibits us from speaking or acting freely in public spaces. 
 
Professor Rosen will need to excuse those who differ with him on whether the concept of 
an Aunwanted gaze@ should guide post-9/11 U.S. domestic security policy.  As we know,  many 
ancient cultures felt threatened by the intrusion of such modern inventions as photography, 
believing that the act of taking their picture represented a theft of their souls.  Few argue that 
such believes are something modern society should institutionalized.  The very concept of the 
"unwanted gaze" seems to credit the notion that people can subjectively determine how much 
privacy that can enjoy as they go about their lives, no matter how strange or incompatible with a 
modern society.   Does Rosen recognize this?  He apparently did not before 9/11, for The 
Unwanted Gaze shows a high degree of tolerance for ethnic communities whose world view is 
driven by anachronistic beliefs: 
 
In traditional Muslim societies, any social recognition between the sexes can be 
interpreted as a prelude to sexual intercourse.  Islamic cannon law requires women 
to cover all but their heads and face.  Muslim women are expected to look 
demurely at the ground at the approach of a man, while men are enjoined from 
gazing directly at women, especially unveiled women.  These different examples 
suggest that although social norms of accessibility vary widely according to 
culture and context, people have a general expectation that they won=t be molested 
by social overtures to which they haven=t explicitly or implicitly given consent.15 
As he does later in The Naked Crowd, Rosen in The Unwanted Gaze expresses chagrin 
that more American do not care about privacy.16 In the latter, he uses as an example Jennifer 
Ringley, Aa twenty-one year old exhibitionist in Washington D.C. who has a Web-cam trained on 
her bedroom twenty four hours a day.@17 He seems to be asking, Where is our sense of decency? 
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If Ms. Ringley does not feel embarrassed, maybe she should.  Civil libertarians, however, should 
be among her strongest supporters in arguing that this choice is her=s.  Rosen seems to be arguing 
that there should be a uniform standard for personal privacy.  The problem: who decides? 
Perhaps those who take offense at the concept that people are free to look at them, and that the 
Aunwanted gaze@ should be legally actionable. 
 
Rosen does not directly argue for eccentric notions of privacy are currently accepted by 
U.S. courts.  A good lawyer, he recognizes  the law is against him, for in America neither the 
Constitution nor the various federal statutes designed to protect against the dissemination of 
private information recognize an inalienable right to be free of all subjectively Aunwanted@
attention.  At some point, the legitimate interest of the state predominates, and courts label 
eccentric notions for what they are.   
 
This point was illustrated during this most recent Supreme Court term, the appeal from a 
Nevada state court conviction of someone who refused to identify himself to a local sheriff.18 
Reporting to the scene of a commotion by the side of the road, the sheriff explained to a drunken 
man standing beside a truck that he was investigating a report of a fight, and asked for 
identification. The man refused, became agitated, insisted he had done nothing wrong, and began 
to taunt the officer by placing his hands behind his back and telling the officer to arrest him and 
take him to jail. This routine kept up for several minutes: the officer asked for identification 
eleven times and was refused each time. After several warning, the sheriff placed him under 
arrest. The arrested man turned out to be Larry Dudley Hiibel, who was charged and convicted of 
the state crime of obstructing a public officer attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office, 
by refusing to provide his name. A majority of the Supreme Court upheld Hiibel=s conviction.  It 
appears that there is no inalienable constitutional right to refuse to provide your name to law 
enforcement, no matter how Aunwanted@ their attention is. 
 
In American jurisprudence, a person=s expectation of privacy need not be obviously 
eccentric to be rejected by American courts as unreasonable.  Consider the case of Wabun-Inini, 
also known as Vernon Bellacourt.19 In March 1989, he left two rolls of color film for processing 
at an F-Stop One Hour Photo Store in Minneapolis   An FBI agent entered the store, displayed 
his credentials, and asked a store clerk whether he could purchase a set of prints from the film 
Wabun-Inini had left to be developed.   The employee obliged. Upon Wabun-Inini's return to the 
F-Stop, store employees informed him that they had provided the FBI with prints of his film. 
Two months later, Wabun-Inini filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Government's 
seizure of the prints was unlawful and requesting injunctive relief.  The district court dismissed 
his case, and Wabu-Inini appealed the dismissal. 
 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing the seminal Supreme Court case of Katz v. 
United States,20 noted that there is a two-part test for determining whether a governmental search 
or seizure is unconstitutional: whether (1) the  person exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation 
of privacy and, (2) the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as Areasonable.@
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Finding that Wabun-Inini had established a subjective expectation of privacy in his film, 
the Eighth Circuit turned to the second prong.  It described a principle that has remained steadfast 
over time: what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not 
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.  To the court,  Wabun-Inini's subjective expectation 
of privacy was not one that society is prepared to recognize as Areasonable,@ in light of the record 
revealing that his photographs were exposed to public view during the development process.  It 
noted that trash, which is enclosed in opaque plastic bags and left on the curb in front of their 
home for collection, can be searched without a warrant.  While the residents of the house may 
minimize the likelihood that the bags contents would be inspected by anyone, this belief is 
objectively unreasonable because they had exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to 
defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment protection.   
 
By analogy, Wabun-Inini's use of the F-Stop for photo processing exposed his 
photographs to the public sufficiently to defeat his claim to Fourth Amendment protection:  
 
We simply hold that Wabun-Inini's decision to leave his film with the photo 
processor in this instance, which used processing techniques involving exposure 
of the photographs to public view for a limited time, make his expectation of 
privacy objectively unreasonable.   Accordingly, we hold that the FBI action here 
did not violate Wabun-Inini's rights under the Fourth Amendment.21 
In American law, the idea that people's weird desires should be subsidized ultimately 
fails, for one=s refusal to be examined when one goes out in public is not legally cognizable.  To 
be sure, courts recognize the constitutional right to privacy, but this is defined by objectively 
reasonable beliefs.  In America, one cannot refuse to have one's picture taken, at least if one 
wants such modern conveniences as the right to operate a motor vehicle.  That view of personal 
privacy would not be objectively reasonable. 
 
In The Unwanted Gaze, Rosen is very direct about his disagreement with these types of 
results and with the Katz doctrine.  While the case applauded as a victory for privacy, AAit soon 
became clear that it was entirely circular.@ He argues: 
 
People=s subjective expectation or privacy tend to reflect the amount of privacy 
they subjectively experience, and as advances in the technology of monitoring and 
searching have made even more intrusive surveillance possible, expectations of 
privacy have naturally diminished, with the corresponding reduction in 
constitutional protection.22 
So what is the problem?  Society moves on.  We have gone beyond the belief that 
photographs of our faces are thefts of our soul.  Our expectations have evolved, with the help of 
technology.  Is this bad?  It seems that technology has also increased our life expectancy.  In 
thinking about personal security, we should not be bound by Luddite beliefs.  Over time, history 
exposes them for what they are: eccentric cranks. 
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Although unknown to Professor Rosen when he wrote The Unwanted Gaze, attempts to 
credit eccentric views of privacy is being played out right now in townhalls across America.  It 
involves a truly benign provision of the USA PATRIOT Act that the ACLU has used to launch a 
major industry-wide hysteria.  The particular industry that claims to be aggrieved by Section 215 
- the organized librarians (a class of people,  perhaps more than other special interest groups, 
have less of an excuse to be misinformed about laws.)  They would have the public believe that 
the PATRIOT Act, which nowhere mentions the word "library" or "librarians," represent a major 
threat to library patrons.  It appears that the FBI, armed with sufficient predication, can actually 
examine out library circulation records.  
 
Is this a new consequence of the USA PATRIOT Act?  Hardly.  Law enforcement always 
had the right to inquire into the retail records, as Rosen knows.  Take the unfortunate example of 
Monica Lewinsky, who Rosen in The Unwanted Gaze portrays as a victim.  Ms. Lewinsky felt 
aggrieved by the Independent Counsel Ken Starr=s issuance of a subpoena for her bookstore 
purchases.   As Rosen describes it: 
 
Lewinsky herself was especially unsettled by Starr=s decision to subpoena a 
Washington bookstore for receipts of all her book purchases as one of the most 
invasive moments in the Starr investigation, along with the moment the 
prosecutors retrieved from her home computers the love letter she had drafter, but 
never sent, to the President.  AIt was such a violation,@ she complained to her 
biographer, Andrew Morton.  AIt seemed that everyone in America had rights 
except for Monica Lewinsky.  I felt like I wasn=t a citizen of this country 
anymore.@23 
Using the Monica Lewinsky as a example of invasion of privacy suffers from two 
problems.  First, the Starr prosecutors were able to obtain a copy of her bookstore purchases 
years well before 9/11 and the USA PATRIOT.  Clearly, Section 215 does not raise a new threat; 
law enforcement, armed with a legitimate need for evidence that may reflect reading habits and 
retail decisions, has always been able to obtain such records.  Second, the sympathy one might be 
inclined to feel for Ms. Lewinsky expression of outrage should be tempered by the realization 
that such outrage is being expressed in the context of her autobiography, a project designed to 
expose her life to as many people as possible around the world. If she was unfairly brought into 
the public eye by the Starr investigation, she certainly did not mind being there in the end.  Like 
Jennifer Ringley, maybe Monica Lewinsky should be embarrassed.  The fact that she was not 
disputes, rather than supports, Rosen=s views of privacy, and of a population that does not view 
privacy as he thinks they should.  Both of Rosen=s book are filled with expressions of this 
frustration.  
 
On the Internet, every Web site we visit, every store we browse in, every 
magazine we skim, and the amount of time we spend skimming it, create 
electronic footprints that increasingly can be traced back to us, revealing detailed 
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patters about our tastes, preferences and intimate thoughts.24 
As in the Naked Crowd, he acknowledges in The Unwanted Gaze that AUnless we pull 
down the curtains and never leave the house, none of us can avoid being observed, and therefore 
judged, fairly or unfairly, by others.@25 In terms of what Americans should do to protect itself 
from the Aunwelcome@ glare of others, is that not a little over the top? 
 
David Cole and Enemy Aliens 
While Rosen expresses these views, across town another academic is making similar 
arguments.  When not teaching at Georgetown Law Center, Professor David Cole represents 
accused supporters of Palestinian terrorists.  His latest book, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards 
and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism (The New Press, 2003) mainly focuses on 
Cole=s often-repeated mantra: that there should be no legal distinction between Americans and 
non-Americans, apparently even when conferring such things as the benefit of American 
citizenship.  Cole believes that the actions the U.S. takes against non-citizens here are a prelude 
to what we will eventually to our own nationals should not exist, since what we do to our illegal 
residents is bound to be turned on us.  In his words,  AWhat we are willing to allow our 
government to do to immigrants today creates a template for how it will treat citizens 
tomorrow.@26 Like Rosen, Cole knows that the law is not on his side.27 Also like Rosen, he is 
chagrined that Americans are not more outraged about what is being done in the name of national 
security. He is shocked, for example, by a National Public Radio poll taken a year after 9/11 
found only 7 percent of American felt they had personally sacrificed any important rights or 
liberties in the war on terrorism.28 
Civil libertarians frequently claim that the events of 9/11 did weird things to people.  To 
them, the government's reaction  - the round-up of several hundreds of illegal aliens from Middle 
East countries, rushing the USA PATRIOT Act through Congress -- surely represented mass 
hysteria.  What about what 9/11 did to them?  
 
For those familiar with Professor Cole=s career, the big surprise on Enemy Aliens crops up 
about a quarter of the way through the book, when the liberal scholar exposes himself to be as a 
law-and-order type.  It seems that Cole, after the shock of 9/11, may be in the pro-security camp 
after all.  He writes: 
 
The PATRIOT Act made many changes to criminal, immigration, banking, and 
intelligence law. Some of these changes sensibly updated criminal law to reflect 
changing technologies.  For example, the advent of cell phones justified the 
PATRIOT Act=s authorization of so-called Aroving wiretaps,@ which permit the 
wiretapping of any phones that a target may reasonably use, rather than only 
specified phone numbers, and the nationwide warrants, which permit taps to 
follow an individual even if he travels outside the jurisdiction of a particular 
federal district.  Other provisions removed barriers to the sharing of information 
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between foreign intelligence and law enforcement officials in international 
terrorism investigations, on the reasonable ground that international terrorism is 
simultaneously a matter of foreign intelligence and criminal law enforcement.  
We certainly want law enforcement authorities with knowledge of Al Qaeda=s
activities abroad talking to those with those with knowledge of Al Qaeda=s
stateside activities.  The PATRIOT Act=s extensive money laundering provisions 
seek to respond to new methods of money laundering , and while the financial 
community has questioned whether these changes will have any effect on 
terrorism, these provisions do not raise civil liberties objections.29 
When it comes to the use of modern technology to gain an insight into the activities of 
those who would cause us harm, it seems that David Cole B unlike Jeffrey Rosen B is not a 
Luddite: he is not alarmed by this new technology or the prospect that it could be effectively 
harnessed by a legal regime to protect against unfair invasions of privacy.   
 
That hope is quickly destroyed.  A few pages later, Cole is back to his old self, criticizing 
some of those provisions he had just heralded as Asensible.@
[The PATRIOT Act] authorizes secret wiretaps in criminal investigations without 
probable cause to believe that the target is engaged in criminal conduct or that 
evidence of a crime will be found... It accomplishes this by amending the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).  FISA authorizes wiretaps and searches, 
based not on the usual showing of probable criminal conduct or evidence, but on 
the much easier showing that the target of the intrusion is an Aagent of a foreign 
power,@ defined very broadly to include any officer or employee of a foreign-
based political organization....The extraordinary authority provided by FISA was 
initially justified on the ground that foreign intelligence gathering is different from 
criminal law enforcement, and that the intelligence power would not be used for 
purposes of investigating crime....[The PATRIOT Act changes to FISA] in effect 
denies the Fourth Amendment=s most basic protection to any person who might 
qualify as a foreign agent B predominantly but not exclusively foreign nationals.  
 
What happened to Cole=s endorsement of the PATRIOT Act=s information-sharing rules, 
premised on the recognition that Ainternational terrorism is simultaneously a matter of foreign 
intelligence and criminal law enforcement?@ What about his acceptance of the need for 
intelligence agents and law enforcement officers to share information about Al Qaeda?  His 
earlier favorable assessments it seems, were premised on the assumption that intelligence-
collection methods such as FISA should taken away from the government.  Why is FISA 
unconstitutional?  According to Cole, it is because the legality of particular FISA surveillance is 
never subject to adversarial testing in the courts.  This conclusion would be somewhat surprising 
to those courts that have issued judicial opinions on the constitutionality of specific FISA 
investigations.30 
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Unlike Rosen, Cole does not spend much space arguing that the American public is too 
dense to see the risks to their privacy.  He is more concerned with government run amok.  Here, 
Cole seems to agree with Rosen that a certain amount of lawlessness is a good thing, since 
stamping it out would mean the government is too efficient.  He notes, for example, AWhile no 
one condones threats of violence, surely every non-citizen who gets into a bar fight with a 
weapon does not warrant unilateral detention, particularly as our law does not authorize such 
detention even for the most hardened, recidivist criminal citizen.@31 To David Cole, a 
government armed with the technological tools that permits it to eliminate violent crime within 
the confines of the constitutional jurisprudence should not deploy them because a little crime and 
violence are somehow an important part of the American experience.  If the law permits the 
development of such technology and the American public reach a consensus that they want it, it 
is because the courts and the people, unlike Cole and Rosen, do not see things their way.  Both 
authors= criticism is directed at the government.  The private sector is spared their wrath.  Neither 
is particularly bothered by the kind of surveillance undertaken by commercial enterprises.  Their 
real beef is with the government, and law enforcement in particular.32 
What is particularly amazing about Cole=s position is it voiced while he acknowledges 
that some of the post-9/11 law enforcement powers have made us us safer.  He is nonetheless 
against them, so ingrained is his anti-government animus:   
 
Some of the measures I have criticized may well make us safer.  Laws aimed at 
denying financial support to organizations that engage in terrorism, for example, 
are likely to hinder those organizations=s ability to do evil, even as they hinder 
many people=s ability to do good. ...And relaxing the threshold requirements for 
searches and surveillance may lead to the discovery of evidence that would have 
otherwise eluded detection., in other words, that some of the measure adopted 
since September 11 may well have made us safer ... My point is that when the 
government relies so heavily on double standards to strike the balance between 
liberty and security, its loss of legitimacy among persons, communities and 
nations potentially our partners in the struggle against terrorist has it own 
substantial security costs.33 
In other words, it is  better if we risk the lives and safety of Americans on own homeland 
than offend those who are visitors here (and who, incidentally, are barred from voting, in a 
perfectly constitutional form of discrimination based on nationality), who would view the U.S. 
government as less Alegitimate.@
Back to the Future? 
Perhaps we should come back to reality, by considering how Rosen and Cole would view 
my perhaps-unrealistic satellite-assisted gait index registry of the future.  As noted, the power of 
my hypothetical scenario is not in its realism or feasibility, but rather  in what it says about our 
legal and political culture.  If such technology was developed, could it be implemented? 
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One of the beauties of my scenario is that it avoid the complaints about racial profiling.  
The gait index is race-blind, as is the technology that compares it against the satellite 
surveillance.  As such, nobody can claim that certain ethnic groups are being unfairly targeted for 
prosecution.  This would seem to solve many of Professor Cole=s complaints, although the 
technology may well result in a disparate impact on defendants of certain ethnicity and national 
origin.  The disparate impact of accurate technology is not objectionable, at least not as a 
constitutional matter. 
 
What about personal privacy, the focus of Professor Rosen=s works?  If courts were more 
inclined to agree with him, people could assert that they have a constitutional right not to have 
their gait being recorded and stored, or their movements in public being recorded by our satellites 
in the sky.  This argument would be unavailing in light of the Katz doctrine.  Like having your 
driver license photograph taken, a videotaped capture, in modern society, does not amount to a 
theft of your soul.  Faced with this reality, Rosen would likely be relegated to arguing that the 
technology could not be perfected.  This is, after all, how he handled a British technology that 
comes close to being the Asilver bullet@ of crime fighting.  
 
In 1996, the City of London adopted a predecessor to the current automated 
license-plate-recognition system that records the plates of all cars entering and 
leaving the city.  The stored license plat numbers are compared with a database of 
those stolen cars, and the system can set off an alarm whenever a suspicious car 
enters the city.34 
What, exactly, is so wrong with this?  Rosen does not say, other then noting current 
science on human face recognition is not as reliable.  That hardly means that such technology 
should not be pursued.  For him, the future is grim, since Americans are no longer alarmed by 
technology.  As he notes in The Unwanted Gaze, A[Nothing in this book offers any reason to 
except that the public will demand laws and technologies that will protect liberty and security at 
the same time ... Refusing to evaluate whether or not these new laws and technologies in fact 
increase security, the public may willingly acquiesce in the destruction of privacy without getting 
anything tangible in return.@35 
Why is this the case?  According to Rosen, it is because our civic debate is too polarized.  On the 
one side is what he calls the technopositivists: those who greet every proposed expansion of 
government surveillance power with unthinking enthusiasm.  On the other side are the 
Aprincipled Luddites,@ who are fighting the Quixotic battle against the proliferation of 
technologies that will ultimately ruin our humanity.36 This polarity minimizes the prospect that a 
true balance can be struck. If true, it is not hard discern where Jeffrey Rosen falls on the 
continuum. 
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